The human freedom of Christ is a test case for how genuinely we admit the reality of Christ's humanity. This article presents Christ's freedom in light of Bernard Lonergan's later theology. A defining influence on the matter in this period was Lonergan's developing understanding of intentionality analysis. The article explains this complex notion and then shows how it throws light on the reality and historicity of Christ's human freedom.
presence of grace in these faculties. The kind of clarity provided by such categories was eminently suited to teasing out what is the most crucial problem concerning Christ's freedom, namely, how Christ's human freedom can be combined with his divine freedom and yet remain a distinct reality. The range of categories for such a discussion had already been studied by Lonergan in his own doctoral dissertation on grace and freedom generally, eventually published in a book of that title. 4 As Lonergan matured in his teaching and writing he entered more and more into questions of consciousness that drew him beyond the strict Scholasticism of his earlier writing toward a more existential kind of philosophy and theology. His name for this new approach was intentionality analysis. The centerpiece of this way of thinking was his theorem about human consciousness structured on four levels of intentionality or consciousness, namely, experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. An advantage of this way of thinking for the topic of freedom is that its perspective is essentially dynamic, with freedom at the apex of a movement beginning in the human psyche and culminating in the dynamism and perfection of human love in action.
Clearly this approach lends itself to the consideration of a second major question regarding Christ's freedom, namely, as to how his freedom developed historically in the various stages of his life on earth. In his study of Lonergan's Christology Crowe maintains that the notion of history provides the key to Lonergan's entire work and to his Christology in particular. 5 The ultimate goal of Christology for Lonergan is soteriological. It has to ground the causality of Christ in human history generally with a view to understanding the communication of the divine friendship to the human race. The starting point for considering this aspect of the divine plan lies in Christ's own freedom as the exemplar and source of our freedom. This is the context within which this article will invoke intentionality analysis for the study of Christ's freedom. It is unfortunate that Lonergan himself never got around to systematically applying that approach to this issue. This is to be regretted particularly because in the last two decades of his career he made considerable progress in his understanding of human freedom and of its place within consciousness and the total philosophy of the person. This article aims to help fill that gap. It concentrates on this later period and assumes some acquaintance with two aspects of Lonergan's thought: first, his cognitional theory, especially as it affects our understanding of Christ's knowledge, and, second, his treatment of Christ's freedom in the earlier period of his work. 6 The latter point is particularly relevant since this treatment is not set aside in the later period but underlies his approach throughout. My study begins with Lonergan's later account of human freedom and then considers Christ's freedom within that horizon.
FREEDOM IN GENERAL
The defining characteristic of intentionality analysis arises from its focus on the operations of consciousness in its various levels. A key phrase that came to sum up this development for Lonergan was the transition "from substance to subject." 7 To speak of subject rather than of substance, or of soul, signals his new focus on consciousness, for "the subject is a substance that is present to itself, that is conscious."
8 It was a factor he thought had been passed over in previous Scholastic accounts of the matter and indeed in faculty psychology generally. Through this new orientation Lonergan in Insight came to develop his notion of the dynamism of consciousness as a self-assembling unity on the three levels of experience, understanding, and judgment. 9 Shortly after publishing Insight, Lonergan began to focus in a new way on the notions of the good and of value, especially when treating the existential subject. 10 As he put it later, the existential subject becomes manifest in the discovery "that our choosing affects ourselves no less than the chosen or rejected objects and that it is up to each of us to decide for himself what he is to make of himself." 11 In a phrase he often repeatsbefore noninclusive language became a problem-he liked to sum up this 6 Both of these aspects have been treated by me elsewhere: Raymond Moloney, The Knowledge of Christ (New York: Continuum, 1999); Moloney, "The Freedom of Christ in the Early Lonergan," Irish Theological Quarterly 74 (2009) fundamental process of personal development as one of "man's making of man." He soon saw that this area was so significant that he had to add a fourth level of consciousness to the three already considered in Insight.
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The thinking behind this development ran as follows.
In Insight Lonergan presents the good as "the rational good," and values as "the possible object of rational choice."
13 As a result, he tends to see deliberation and decision as simply an extension of cognitional activity. 15 The objectivity of the judgment of value, as in Insight, remains something to be assessed on the third level of intentionality, but it is the criterion for such a judgment that points beyond this third level. While various considerations from external factors can enter into that judgment of value, the key factor lies in the human subjects themselves, and the decisive criterion lies in the authenticity or lack of it in the very being of the individual subject. "Ethical value is the conscious emergence of the subject as autonomous, responsible and free."
16 This is what Lonergan means by the emergence of the existential subject.
Feelings and Intersubjectivity
A further key factor that enters into Lonergan's notions of the existential subject and the fourth level of consciousness is the crucial role of feelings in the formation of our values. Many who know Lonergan only from Insight would have seen him as predominantly a "head-person" and maybe would have found the intellectual rigor of his thought uncongenial. In this later period he is very clear that the cognitive levels of consciousness are not enough; they have to be "subsumed under the higher operations that integrate knowing with feeling."
17 On one page in Method in Theology he gives us a remarkable list of the range of feelings he has in mind, 18 but among these the principal ones relevant to my topic are those in which values first rise above the horizon of consciousness. Feelings can 12 Lonergan, Topics in Education 82. 13 Insight 601 / 624. 14 "The goodness of being comes to light only by considering the extension of intellectual activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will" (ibid. 596 / 619).
15 Method in Theology 36-37. 16 Topics in Education 37. 17 19 Indeed he now assigns a much deeper role to feelings generally in his account of the human psyche. As he now puts it, "The whole mass and momentum of living is in feeling." 20 An extension of this psychic level of meaning comes with Lonergan's growing appreciation of intersubjectivity."
21 This is a form of meaning and communication which, like our spontaneous feelings, exists on a preconceptual, preintellectual level. There is a sense in which, prior to any differentiation of consciousness, we become aware of our belonging to one another as persons in a common humanity, prior to the distinction of "I" and "thou," a community of subjects summated in a "we."
22 On this instinctive level we are all members of one another before we think about it. By way of illustration, Lonergan remarks that if I see an infant in front of me about to fall over, I instinctively reach out to save it. 23 The kind of meaning here is not that which arises in discourse. Commonly it is symbolic, as when mother and child smile at each other. The smile is a symbol, but the meaning of such a symbol is not about some object; rather it reveals a person. In certain circumstances, Lonergan tells us, such intersubjectivity can be "raised to a pitch of intensity" where, in what he calls "incarnate meaning," the whole significance of a person's life comes to expression: "The meaning resides in the person, in everything he has done leading up to this moment." 24 He thinks especially of the lives of the great heroes of history such as Socrates or Jesus, but at times a person's meaning may all be concentrated in a single symbolic gesture or even in a single symbol such as the crucifix.
25

A Prior Freedom
One of the factors that helped Lonergan on his path from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis was his reading of existentialist thinkers. From Heidegger he discovered an aspect of things that formed a significant adjunct to his treatment of how feelings reveal values. him that there is a meaning of freedom underlying anything discussed in faculty psychology: But besides that freedom, which is the freedom with which ethics and moral theology are concerned, there is freedom in quite another and prior sense. That prior and less accurate sense is nonetheless a true sense, a sense of a different kind, of course, one that is hardly even analogous, in fact one that might even be called equivocal; but it is very significant. It is the freedom with which consciousness emerges upon the flow of neural determinants.
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This freedom is an attribute by which consciousness is not totally determined by external or internal objects, by biological or sensitive conditions and determinants. As a result one has a fundamental autonomy to develop one's own horizon on the world. This prior level of freedom is what Heidegger called Sorge, sometimes translated as "concern" or "care." Consciousness, says Lonergan, is not a marketplace into which there enters anything whatever. 27 There is a selection process at work, governed from within by the accumulation of the person's interests and attentiveness and habits of thought and feeling. In its formation we have been exercising our freedom, but largely spontaneously and inadvertently, as one makes oneself to be what one has become. Lonergan refers to it as a "concrete synthesis of conscious living"; it forms a kind of filter for everything that enters our awareness.
28 With this as a formative factor, one goes on more deliberately to build one's character, one's self.
29 "The man that one has to be is not what one necessarily is. It is something that follows . . . from the use of one's freedom." 30 In this way we enter into that fundamental process of "man's making of man."
Community and Love
As Lonergan describes this emergence of the existential subject on the fourth level of consciousness, it must not be thought of as an event in splendid isolation, as the individualism that many other philosophies might conceive it to be. This soon becomes clear as one seeks further light on the criterion of our values. Authenticity for Lonergan has within it a distinct moral element by which the person becomes committed to living according to values rather than according to the satisfaction of spontaneous desires and aversions. 31 values and lets you really see them is being in love." 32 Again he writes, "Being in love provides the real criterion by which all else is to be judged." 33 Eventually he begins to speak of a "knowledge born of love" and of "the eye of love." 34 With this development Lonergan's philosophy of freedom seems to take wings and to open out into a whole new context of affectivity, spirituality, and, as we will see eventually, grace.
35 Part of the background for this context is the fact that for Lonergan the criterion of authentic values is not found in the subject as though in isolation but as supported by other persons with whom we live in society. 36 We meet one another, he says, in a common concern for values. 37 As a result community is one of the key formative factors in the articulation of the values that motivate our freedom. Lonergan's notion of the human person is essentially a communal one, and "the strongest and the best of the relationships between persons is love."
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From this point on, the notion of being in love becomes a central one in Lonergan's philosophy of freedom. Indeed it is the culmination of the drive for truth and value, which is the moving power in the upward dynamism of consciousness, and at the same time a new beginning in the unfolding of a human life.
[One's] capacity for self-transcendence . . . becomes an actuality when one falls in love. Then one's being becomes being-in-love. Such being-in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its conditions, its occasions. But once it has blossomed forth and as long as it lasts, it takes over. It is the first principle. From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds. 39 Clearly this kind of language is well adapted to developing a more explicitly religious and Christian consideration regarding both the ordinary believer and Christ himself.
Here I might also note, as a preparation for Christology, how the perspectives I have been uncovering promote the idea that Lonergan's way of speaking of the notion of "person" developed. notion and definition of person. 40 But when writing in terms of contemporary concerns and contexts he is well aware that the ontological notion of person, so easily interpreted statically, is not sufficient; he now approaches the notion of person through the notions of identity, subject, and subjectivity. 41 In this approach the notion of the human person emerges for Lonergan with personal freedom on the fourth level of consciousness. 42 One's identity is that by which one remains one and the same subject through all the stages of life, but the human subject cannot be conceived as fixed and immutable; and so the subject has its subjectivity. By one's subjectivity one is in a process of self-realization through self-transcendence, but the differences that emerge in this process regard not one's identity but one's subjectivity. Furthermore, as already noted, Lonergan regards personhood in a communal way. Community is one of the key formative factors in the articulation of the values that motivate our freedom. We are, each of us, he says, "becoming a person in a human society." 43 One becomes a person in one's dealings with other persons.
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Two Kinds of Development A significant refinement of the notions I have been considering came about when Lonergan began to speak of development as a movement in two directions, ascending and descending. Though the idea seems to have its origin in Method in Theology where Lonergan discusses two phases of theology, only in the final years of his writing did he begin to explore the possibilities of the notion. 45 For human development is of two quite different kinds. There is development from below upwards, from experience to growing understanding, from growing understanding to balanced judgment, from balanced judgment to fruitful courses of action, and from fruitful courses of action to the new situations that call forth further understanding, profounder judgment, richer courses of action. But there also is development from above downwards. There is the transformation of falling 40 in love: the domestic love of the family; the human love of one's tribe, one's city, one's country, mankind; the divine love that orientates man in his cosmos and expresses itself in its worship. 46 One of the advantages of this notion lies in providing a framework within which the fullness of human development can be considered. The ascending movement takes account of people developing their potential from within themselves, where the intentionality of the person provides the dynamism for the upward movement. As we have seen, the keynote here is self-transcendence reaching its highpoint in self-fulfillment; but self-fulfillment can too easily become auto-sufficiency, the hallmark of an unchristian individualism, and this in turn can lead to a narrow notion of freedom as simply emancipation rather than as loving the good. 47 But for Lonergan the ultimate in self-transcendence is love, and love means other people. Consequently from the 1960s he was conscious that this highpoint in his scheme of consciousness "is not so private as to be solitary." 48 The later insight into the complementary nature of the two movements enables him to strengthen this qualification of self-fulfillment by developing the aspect of community. Indeed it is community, on its various levels-the family, the local community, society at large-that provides the dynamism for the downward movement, and with community come other factors that are especially important when one passes to theology: belief, tradition, church, praxis.
Lonergan traces the path of this second mode of development through each of the four levels of consciousness as follows:
On affectivity rests the apprehension of values. On the apprehension of values rests belief. On belief follows the growth of understanding of one who has found a genuine teacher and has been initiated into the study of the masters of the past. Then to confirm one's growth in understanding comes experience made mature and perceptive by one's developed understanding. 49 Though both movements are interdependent in their ongoing development, the key meeting point between the two is located on the fourth level of consciousness, adding even further significance to Lonergan's account of the dynamic state of being in love. It might be described as the fulcrum of his total system, where, with most far-reaching consequences, philosophy is drawn into theology, the natural into the supernatural, and, crucially for our topic, human loving as the fulfillment of conscious intentionality is embraced by the gift of divine love poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit. 46 A Third Collection 106. 47 
APPLICATION TO CHRIST
In 1956 Lonergan published an important supplement to his notes on Christology. This supplement provides a bridge between the early and the later Lonergan in the topics of concern here. 50 The centerpiece of this work is the original and singular notion of consciousness that Lonergan here elaborates. The notion arises on the level of experience rather than of knowledge, as an infrastructure of knowledge rather than as a full act of knowing. This notion of consciousness is a basic element in the difference between Lonergan's approach and that of many other writers on human interiority, such as Karl Rahner and Paul Ricoeur, a difference that is often not appreciated. Unfortunately all this would require a separate article to explain; here I can only refer to it, 51 but it should be underlined that this notion of consciousness is presupposed in all that remains to be said about Lonergan's subsequent development.
A second important contribution of this work lies in the way it provides the parameters for any further discussion of Christ's interiority. This is well brought out in a conclusion to a book review Lonergan wrote in 1959 summarizing some of the main lines of De constitutione Christi.
A parallelism is to be recognized between ontological and psychological statements about the incarnate Word. The main parallel statements are that, as there is one person with a divine and a human nature, so there is one subject with a divine and a human consciousness. As the person, so also the subject is without division or separation. As the two natures, so also the divine and the human consciousness are without confusion or interchange. As the person, so also the subject is a divine reality. As the human nature, so also the human consciousness is assumed. As there is a great difference between "being God" and "being a man," so also there is a great difference between "being conscious of oneself as God" and "being conscious of oneself as man." As the former difference is surmounted hypostatically by union in the person, so the latter difference is surmounted hypostatically by union in the subject. As the two natures do not prove two persons, so the divine and the human consciousness do not prove two subjects.
52
The first point that is striking in this paragraph is the fact that for Lonergan there is only one subject in Christ, and that a divine reality. Second, this one subject does not mean that there is only one subjectivity. There is both a divine consciousness or subjectivity and a human consciousness or subjectivity, just as there is both a divine freedom and a human freedom, each consciousness distinct from the other. consciousness and subjectivity that sets the scene for the development of Christ's human freedom. A basic task of this Christology is to gain some imperfect understanding of "a single divine identity being at once subject of divine consciousness and also subject of a human consciousness" 53 -all this in order to see how "the life lived by Jesus of Nazareth really was the fully human life of the second person of the Blessed Trinity."
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Subjectivity here refers to a field of awareness, namely, to that aspect of our consciousness that embraces both the acts of a person that are commonly recognized as conscious and the person who is subject and source of those acts. Lonergan distinguished identity from subjectivity, parallel to the distinction between person and nature. Jesus' identity or personhood was divine; nevertheless he "had a truly human subjectivity that grew in wisdom and age and grace before God and men." Lonergan does not hesitate to attribute to Christ "the developing subjectivity of a human life," and so this subjectivity is the locus for the developing freedom of Christ. 55 What I have been considering up to now is the constitution of Christ's being as the ultimate source and criterion of the values revealed by Christ. It remains for me to consider the process by which these values were formed and brought to expression in Christ's life and preaching. An older theology was often content to vindicate the reality simply of Christ's nature and of its faculties. Human nature is a constant, but as well as human nature there is a variable element that Lonergan calls human historicity. "Nature is given man at birth. Historicity is what man makes of man."
56 That is the process to which Lonergan's account of freedom draws our attention. It is clear that he envisages an analogy between the development of Christ's human freedom and that of human beings generally, focusing on what he likes to call "man's making of man." In one place he stated this analogy as follows, placing it in the context of the two kinds of development already referred to:
If we are to think of Jesus as truly a man, we have to think of him as a historical being, as growing in wisdom, age and grace in a determinate social and cultural milieu, as developing from below as other human beings and from above on the analogy of religious development. 57 When one proposes this analogy between Christ and human beings generally, warning bells may well be sounding in the minds of more traditional theologians of a "descending" Christology. The proposal might seem to compromise the uniqueness of Christ, since he is not just one in a list of human savior-figures. His uniqueness has to be based ultimately on his 53 A Third Collection 94. 54 Ibid. 77. 55 For the notion of subjectivity and its distinction from subject, identity, and personhood, see "Christology today: Methodological Reflections," in A Third Collection 74-99, at 90-95; the last two quotations at 94. 56 Ibid. 170. 57 Ibid. 82.
identity as the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. In Lonergan's case this outcome is assured, seeing that, within his theorem of two kinds of development, all those influences "from above" have their wellspring in the divine identity of the Son of Man. But in Christ there is also development "from below," and this is the basis for the analogy of which I speak. In any human being, as Lonergan noted, such development comes to fulfillment on the fourth level of consciousness, when the human person exercises his or her freedom. By their choices human beings, for better or for worse, are engaged in making themselves what they are to be. By following this path one produces, in Lonergan's phrase, "the first and only edition of himself." 58 Consequently, even on the human level, once the life of the "drifter" is spurned, 59 there is an authentic uniqueness to be gained by the free and responsible subject opting for genuine values. Clearly this happens to a supreme degree in the case of Christ, so that the human uniqueness, constituted by his human freedom, is the correlate of his uniqueness as divine. Indeed the one is the manifestation of the other, as the Word incarnate, in his historicity, makes himself a man.
Factors on the Levels of Consciousness
Reflection on the historicity of Jesus brings us up against specific problems on the various levels of consciousness. First of all, on the level of what Lonergan means by experience, especially internal experience, there is the problematic area of Christ's human psyche. The first and most emphatic point to be made here underlines the impossibility of any depth analysis of the psychology of the God-Man, a point frequently made in contemporary Christology. 60 If such analysis were not already excluded by the mysteriousness of the hypostatic union, it would be placed well beyond our reach by the literary genre of the gospel narrative. E. L. Mascall said effectively the same thing when he wrote memorably many years ago, "It is indeed both ridiculous and irreverent to ask what it feels like to be God incarnate." 61 Ruling out such an analysis, however, does not mean that nothing can be said. If Christ is fully man as well as God, then his humanity must in some 58 A Second Collection 83. 59 "Drifter" is Lonergan's favorite expression for the person who flies from the risk and responsibility of freedom and chooses to follow the crowd (Phenomenology and Logic 238). 60 way be open to the influence of the unconscious, and the question arises as to whether we can say anything about how he must have integrated that psychic energy into the conscious dynamism of his human being. Clearly this topic has a special relevance for his freedom and whether or not such energy would have promoted or limited its development and fulfillment. Unfortunately one's approach to this question will be conditioned by the emphases (and biases?) that one brings to bear from one's interpretation of the human psyche generally. Many of our contemporaries, influenced either directly or indirectly by the ideas associated with Sigmund Freud, will tend to reduce the inner tendencies of the psyche to the one basic desire of which the real object is sexual. A contrary view however can be elaborated by those inspired by the writings of C. G. Jung. For them psychic energy has no determinate object. Its original orientation is "neutral, undetermined and undifferentiated," directed in an indeterminate teleology toward the whole of the personality.
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Robert Doran has embraced this latter perspective as fitting in with Lonergan's approach to the finality of consciousness and pointing to a healthier interpretation of human psychology generally. Here I invoke it as a possible way of thinking of Christ in particular. Positively, it helps us apply to Jesus Lonergan's notion of human feeling as constituting the "mass and momentum" of our lives. Negatively, it helps to hold at bay the insinuations that are sometimes present when people discuss our Lord's relations with Mary Magdalen, especially when the writer does not feel bound by the traditional exclusion from Christ not only of sin but of concupiscence, 63 an issue to which I will return below. In all this, of course, I have been working on a parallel between the human subjectivity of Christ and that of human beings generally. However, it soon becomes clear, as I pass from the experiential to the cognitional and volitional levels, that this parallel cannot be complete. The starting point for knowing and loving in Christ's human life is not that of a tabula rasa. On the cognitional level, even in his humanity he is endowed with certain special gifts from the beginning; they are part of that "development from above," which has already been explained. Lonergan, for example, holds to the classical teaching of the presence of the beatific vision in Christ from his earliest years. 64 Christ's human knowledge, especially of the component arising from the beatific vision. Such an emphasis tends to undermine the case for ignorance in Christ and so to weaken, if not exclude, any notion of acquired knowledge and its development. By the same token, this emphasis would also seriously limit the scope for development in his human freedom. However, in contemporary theology various authors have accommodated in their approach a level of ignorance in Christ and so room for acquired knowledge. 65 Lonergan is one of these, though his way of doing so depends ultimately on his singular view of human knowledge and consciousness. This is a very complex subject, which I cannot enter into here. 66 A second factor that distinguishes the human subjectivity of Christ is his absolute freedom from sin, an attribute of his which has figured in church teaching since the New Testament. 67 This doctrine of Christ's sinlessness can be a problem for many theologians who take as their premise Christ's solidarity with sinful human nature. As one writer put it forcefully, "To say that Jesus was not free to be immoral would seem to me to be the equivalent of saying that he was not moral at all." 68 The exclusion of the very possibility of immorality in the case of Christ is stronger in the Thomist school, where anything less is regarded as an absolute impossibility. Despite the imperfections in his theology generally, Tertullian was able to give us the basic reason for this viewpoint long before there were Thomists: "God alone is without sin. Alone of human beings Christ is without sin, because Christ is God." 69 In other words, sin is unthinkable in the case of Christ because sinning is an act of the person. In him there is only a divine person, and that makes any notion of sinfulness in him a contradiction in terms. Such was Lonergan's position in his codex on Christology, 70 and there is no reason to think that he ever wavered subsequently.
The Process of the Formation of Values
The question now arises as to the sense in which we can speak of the growing freedom of Christ within the limits established by these special endowments of his humanity. Given the unique status of Jesus as Word incarnate and as bearer of special gifts in his humanity, and in light of the fact that the being of the person is the ultimate criterion of our values, all the values to which Christ is committed have to reside from the outset in the depths of his being in a mystery that lies beyond us. However, one of the principles of Lonergan's notion of the special endowment of the mind of Christ is that Christ could not apply those values to his situation nor find words in which to express them without the addition of experience, internal and external, and the acquired knowledge of his world.
Lonergan's vindication of the need for acquired knowledge in Christ is the key to his case for growth in Christ's freedom. Such growth in knowledge opens up space for understanding the historicity of that freedom. 71 In this view Christ had to learn to articulate in the concrete, to himself and to others, the values that mattered to him and at the same time to commit himself in freedom to their implementation in his world. It is sometimes said that freedom means being oneself, becoming oneself and becoming what one is. 72 That can be said of Jesus in the fullest sense of the expression, since in his case it means becoming in his humanity what he is already in the depths of his divine personhood.
A further sense of "growth in freedom" can be found in Christ as he wrestles throughout his life with the limitations of finite nature in facing the daunting challenges of his mission. In this struggle, Gethsemane marks a high point. Ever since Maximus the Confessor, scholars have been able to recognize in the story of Christ's agony the spontaneous recoil of his natural will for survival, reinforced by the resistance of the sense appetite. 73 Clearly it is the Father's will that Jesus should come to his ultimate choice only through the experience of the natural movements of human nature. 74 Consequently the initial struggle in the garden is not evidence of the alienation of his will but precisely of conformity to the order of providence in his regard. 75 Conversion is a central theme in Lonergan's view of human development. It refers to the process by which the developing human being takes up basic stances with regard to one's sense of reality, religion, and moral authenticity. Frederick Crowe has raised the question as to what extent Lonergan's famous notion of a threefold conversion-intellectual, moral, 71 It is significant that the first outline of Lonergan's account of Christ's historicity comes in the context of his thesis on Christ's knowledge in the third edition of De Verbo incarnato 344-46.
72 Phenomenology and Logic 238, 240; Topics in Education 80-81. 73 The point of this paragraph, and in particular the position of Maximus, is discussed in more detail in Moloney, "The Freedom of Christ in the Early Lonergan" 32-33. 74 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 3, q. 18, a. 6, obj. 1. 75 Lonergan discussed Christ's obedience to the Father in a nuanced way in De Verbo incarnato 436-43. and religious-can be verified in the case of Christ. It is a delicate matter, not commonly raised with the kind of nuance required by the status of Christ's being and the innate giftedness of his humanity. With such a caveat in mind, Crowe points out that one must distinguish "the reversal of direction in a normal conversion from the positive forward momentum it supplies." 76 This observation applies clearly enough to the category of moral conversion where, as I have just noted, any suggestion of Christ's overcoming sin simply could not arise.
As regards intellectual conversion, one can say, first of all, that the certainty with which Christ preaches the truths of both old and new covenants is clearly relevant. In such tradition and belief, with their sense of objective truth, "are the seeds of intellectual conversion."
77 Furthermore there is a sense in which this conversion occurs in every child who comes to the use of reason and spontaneously begins to operate on criteria of sufficient evidence. 78 While one can certainly grant such levels of conversion in the case of Christ, to discuss the presence or absence in him of a more thematic awareness of intellectual conversion and the differentiations of consciousness associated with it would carry us beyond the focus of this article on the fourth level of consciousness.
As regards religious conversion, one might distinguish it in its vertical and horizontal dimensions. In the former sense, as a relationship to God, Lonergan's conviction about Christ's beatific vision from infancy would seem to rule out any room for the notion of conversion in the vertical sense. In an address given in 1964 Lonergan remarked that Christ in his humanity did not will means to reach an end, but already on earth possessed the end, the vision of God, and from this plenitude overflowed in love to loving us. 79 In this Christ was acting in the image of his Father who, in creating us, "overflowed from love of the infinite to loving even the finite." 80 However, in the concrete unfolding of the implications of this overflowing love in Christ's relations with other people, something analogous to the notion of religious conversion can be attributed to him. Christ had to articulate in the concrete where he stood on the various issues and groups that contested the religious situation around him. Lonergan sees it as a form of conversion when one begins to belong to one's group in society in a new way.
81 Something along these lines could certainly be attributed to our Savior. 
Community and Feeling
The first section of this article discussed how, in the later stages of his development, Lonergan's general account of human freedom often dwelt on the notion of man's making of man. It is by formulating for oneself one's values and committing oneself to them in practice that one becomes a person in the existentialist sense. "It is in choosing that I become myself. The self that results consists in habits and dispositions that emerge from my past choices. That self is mine." 82 In the case of Christ further light can be shed on this process by considering two intertwined factors in the growing maturity of the human being: the communal aspect of subjectivity and the developing role of feeling. The influence of community on the formation of our freedom is one of the main factors in that "downward" kind of development he explained on a previous page of the work cited in note 46. Of this mode of development Lonergan writes: "It moves from above downwards inasmuch as one belongs to a hierarchy of groups and so owes allegiance to one's home, to one's country, to one's religion."
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Lonergan has various ways of naming the communities that form us but always first place is given to the family. For him the handing on of development begins in the affectivity of the infant, and on that affectivity rests the apprehension of values. 84 On a subsequent page he writes: "Children are born in a cradling environment of love. By a long and slow process of socialization, acculturation, education they are transferred from their initial world of immediacy into the local variety of the world mediated by meaning and motivated by values." 85 In line with this approach it seems more appropriate to consider that the final formation and articulation of Christ's values in the concrete should not by-pass the ordinary channels by which such values are formed in human hearts and minds. The nurturing care of parents communicates to the child a quality of feeling associated ever after with the values the parents themselves embody in the love they bestow. One can only welcome the deeper appreciation such a view gives us of the roles of Mary and Joseph in the early years of Jesus' life.
One particular aspect of human feeling stressed by Lonergan is intersubjectivity, especially in the sense of "incarnate meaning." In his Christology this aspect acquired a central significance: he held that one of the main differences the incarnation brought about lies precisely in the opening up of intersubjectivity between God and believers. Intersubjectivity implies a two-way relationship, namely, how Jesus felt about his fellow human beings and how they felt about him. But Lonergan carries the point beyond 82 Phenomenology and Logic 238, emphasis original. 83 Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980 361. 84 A Third Collection 181.
85 simply the level of mutual human sympathy. He speaks of it as a relationship with Christ as God. 86 In this way Lonergan's approach to intersubjectivity affects our knowledge of God and helps to qualify the doctrine of the impassibility and immutability of the divine. In turn this means that not only was there intersubjectivity at work between Christ and his immediate contemporaries, but that there is now a possibility of such intersubjectivity between every generation of Christians and their Savior.
As a result, says Lonergan, there comes about a specific difference between the religious experience of the Christian and religious experience in general; Christ's own intersubjectivity makes possible for us a distinctive religious experience, notably in the way it affects our intimate relationship with him. 87 Applying to this case Lonergan's general notion of the matter, we can see that by his subjectivity Christ has a Mitwelt, a world-with-him of other persons, with whom he is aware of living. In that world persons are known not as objects, but as subjects, creatures of fellow-feeling. 88 We might see instances of this kind of relationship at work in Christ's spontaneous reaction to the plight of the paralyzed man in John 5:7, or to that of the widow of Nain in Luke 7:13.
A further deepening of this intersubjectivity can be seen in Lonergan's account of how the human condition has determined the form of human perfection Christ pursued in his freedom during his life on earth. Human perfection, says Lonergan, could have taken various forms, but it took the actual form of poverty and suffering because of us:
Christ chose and decided to perfect himself in the manner in which he did because of us. We think of the way of the cross primarily as the cross of Christ. But primarily the way of the cross is the way in which fallen nature acquires its perfection. . . . It was because he was redeeming a fallen humanity that Christ chose to perfect himself, to become the perfect man; by his own autonomous choices he was thinking of us and thinking of what we needed to be able to attain our own self-mediation. 89 At this point one might consider how that special sense of freedom that Lonergan took over from Heidegger can be included in the process we are considering. This sense of freedom is what Lonergan refers to as a "concrete synthesis of conscious living" that goes into the formation of one's horizon on the world. As I indicated in my first section, the formation of such a synthesis comes about in people partly spontaneously and inadvertently, though not without the concurrence of their freedom. It is an accumulation of their Taking these influences first in a positive manner, one can see in the New Testament that Jesus is immediately a man of his time and place, reflecting not only a general love of his people as human beings but also a patriotic love of his nation with its milieu, its history, and its place in divine providence. These values have not only shaped his language and his imagination, but he has embraced them and made them his own. Such influences inevitably generate a corresponding set of feelings that enter into the freedom of the God-man to give color and passion to his life and mission.
However, there is also a negative aspect. Lonergan likes to point out that human traditions easily go astray. In the case of Christ there has to be a tension in his mind and heart between, on the one hand, his love for all that was genuine in the traditions of his people and, on the other, his opposition to the deviation and biases that had often set such traditions on the wrong path. Matthew 23:23 (where Jesus excoriates the scribes and Pharisees for heeding the lesser laws while neglecting the weightier ones) captures the two poles of this tension-whatever the historical basis of that text. In another context Lonergan once remarked that human development takes place largely through the resolution of conflicts.
92
As Lonergan developed his expression of the various communities that give character to our freedom, he began to describe them not just as areas of collective living but as different manifestations of love: domestic love, love of neighbor, love of God. 93 This growing emphasis on love as one of the defining principles of Lonergan's worldview corresponds not only to the inner dynamic of his own developing thought but also, of course, to the central tenet of the gospel, thereby establishing a striking harmony between his philosophy and his theology. Around this issue of the centrality of love in human living and Christian faith, the crucial struggle of Christ's freedom against the social and political forces ranged against him can come into focus. As Lonergan remarks in one place, fulfillment for human living lies not in righteousness but in love.
94
This emerging predominance of the theme of love is one of the permanent fruits of Lonergan's recourse to intentionality analysis. It can be set in some contrast with the stricter Thomism of the faculty psychology he used in his early discussions of freedom. It has been pointed out that this new perspective marks a shift from a Thomistic to a more Augustinian emphasis in Lonergan's later work. 95 For students of Christology this perspective suggests an original approach to the inner harmony between humanity and divinity in Christ. It points to Christ as the incarnation of the apex of freedom on this earth when the love in which his human self-transcendence culminates is subsumed into the divine life within him.
Lonergan entertains the possibility of ordinary human beings falling in love with God and reaching "a dynamic state of being in love with God." 96 He also speaks of the significance this can have for other people: "Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise." 97 These concepts of his intentionality analysis have to have their highest meaning in the case of Christ. There they are endowed with unique significance as the providential expression in human terms of the mystery of divine personhood dwelling within him. In the whole history of human freedom nothing can surpass the dynamic state of being in love with God as it is found in the heart of Jesus of Nazareth.
CONCLUSION
"Freedom," wrote Camus, is "that terrible word, inscribed on the chariot of the storm."
98 Few topics strike so deeply at the heart of what we mean by personhood and humanity. In the context of Christology the question of freedom presents us with a test case of how genuinely we confess the full reality of Christ's humanity. The distinction Lonergan explicitly made between identity and subjectivity, between unique ontological subject and twofold consciousness, has meant that in applying his notion of "man's making of man" to the exploration of Christ's humanity we are simply following out the implications of his own position. The theological significance of this position comes home when one reflects that this development takes place entirely within the Cyrillan legacy of the Ephesine-Chalcedonian tradition while resolutely holding at bay the Nestorianizing tendencies that are such a temptation for too many of our contemporaries when faced with the problems of Christ's freedom. That Lonergan follows his master Aquinas in that tradition was brought out in this article especially by the issue of Christ's sinlessness. The Cyrillan legacy has always left the tradition exposed to the risk of Monophysite tendencies in particular, a risk guarded against in Lonergan's case by his subtle philosophy of mind. This is the key to the way he can elaborate a nuanced notion of Christ's human development while remaining within the perspective of the one ontological subject asserted in his own way by Cyril of Alexandria.
FREEDOM OF CHRIST IN LONERGAN
